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a lack of preparation
learning from experience
Over 600 communities on the Atlantic and Gulf
coasts are vulnerable to the devastating impacts of
severe hurricanes. While there are many communi-
ties at risk, relatively few have experienced the ma-
jor recovery and reconstruction process that follows
a major storm. Many communities are unprepared
for the pressing issues that will face a community
after a disaster. This lack of pre-storm planning can
affect a community's ability to recover quickly and
smoothly should a coastal disaster occur. With more
readily predicted community disasters, such as river-
ine flooding, decision-makers can build on their
community's past experience to plan for and mitigate
the impacts of future occurrences. Hurricanes, on
the other hand, have a low probability of striking
particular communities in any given year. As a re-
sult, they do not provide a good base from which
local officials and policymakers can "learn from ex-
perience." The severity of a hurricane's economic and
psychological impact, furthermore, demands an ex-
amination of the post-disaster and reconstruction ef-
forts of hurricane stricken communities from which
disaster planning techniques can be developed.
Severe hurricanes destroy existing development
so effectively that they have been called "the purest
form of urban renewal." Communities often use hur-
ricane demolition as a means of altering their pre-
storm development patterns. Development is moved
away from hazardous areas to reduce private property
loss and to minimize the amount of public infrastruc-
ture at risk. A community may have the opportunity
to acquire prime waterfront property and thereby
expand its public beach areas, alter undesirable de-
velopment trends and reconstruct severely damaged
areas in more attractive and less vulnerable ways
than existed previously. While a disaster may present
opportunities for changing development patterns,
it also creates a number of pressures on the commu-
nity which may work against the enactment of de-
velopment management policy changes. In an effort
to better understand these pressures and obstacles
in the post-storm reconstruction process, three com-
munities heavily impacted by recent hurricanes were
studied as cases of development management. The
three communities included: Harrison County, Missis-
sippi (Hurricane Camille, 1969); Gulf Shores, Ala-
bama (Hurricane Fredrick, 1979); and the Galveston
Bay area (Hurricane Alicia, 1983). This article will
briefly discuss the redevelopment and reconstruction
trends observed in these communities.
Harrison County, Mississippi
Hurricane Camille, which battered the Gulf coast
in August 1969, is one of two "category 5" storms
on the Saffir-Simpson scale ever recorded to strike
the United States (category 5 is the most severe). The
This article is based on information collected under
NSF Grant No. CEE-8217U5, Hurricane Hazard Re-
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Bob and Janet Helm, right, face off against Carol and Nancy Cash in a game of cards at the evacuation center set up at West Brunswick High School
storm had a seven mile wide storm center, winds of
over 200 miles per hour, and a storm surge that
ranged from 17-23 feet in the coastal communities
of Harrison County, Mississippi. While older stately
homes in the sheltered higher areas on the coast sur-
vived the storm, almost all construction in the lower
lying lands was destroyed. This included a "hurricane
proof" house which was totally destroyed, killing the
owner and the friends who had sought shelter with
him.
Four of the communities most severly hit by Hur-
ricane Camille were in Harrison County. Gulfport
and Biloxi are sizable towns of almost 50,000 residents;
Long Beach and Pass Christian are considerably
smaller with only 6,000 and 3,000 residents, respec-
tively. These communities have been plagued by
storm damages since their founding. After a hurri-
cane caused extensive damage to the beach highway
in 1915, a seawall was constructed along the entire
length of Harrison County's 26 mile shoreline. Sub-
sequent coastal storms and hurricanes caused the
shoreline to erode dramatically. In 1951, construc-
tion began on an artificial sand beach to act as a
protective barrier for the seawall highway and low-
lying development. Today, a costly annual beach
nourishment program sustains the beach.
The National Flood Insurance Program was insti-
tuted one year before Hurricane Camille hit the Gulf
Coast. Unfortunately, at that time, there were no
communities yet participating in the program. After
the storm, the Governor of Mississippi established
a 12-member commission — the Governor's Emer-
gency Council (GEO — to act as a temporary overseer
of long range regional development of the impacted
coastline. This role was later expanded to include the
coordination of Federal Disaster Relief efforts when
President Nixon designated the GEC as the single
contact for federal aid. Despite the equal representa-
tion of coastal residents and federal administrators
on the GEC, its policies were subject to frequent at-
tack and condemnation by residents of these ex-
tremely conservative coastal communities.
The lack of adequate flood insurance was a pri-







Seawall at Galveston Bay
Harrison County. Many property owners did not
ever rebuild. According to interviews conducted with
local realtors during the summer of 1984, land prices
fell dramatically after the storm. For many years
prices remained depressed. In the period immedi-
ately following the storm, development was concen-
trated in the rural, upland area of the county. To
this day, developers and local realtors admit that
they are conscious of the dangers of building in the
most low-lying lands. There has been a general re-
luctance to redevelop along the shoreline.
Biloxi and Gulfport had both adopted a building
code a number of years before Camille. As part of
the requirement for acceptance into the National
Flood Insurance Program, these Building Codes were
strengthened and extended county-wide. General
confusion resulted from a waiver of the building per-
mit procedures immediately following the storm,
several rounds of revisions to the new code, and lack
of compliance on the part of lending institutions
such as Farmers Home Administration. The end result
was that a large (but unknown) number of buildings
severely damaged by the storm throughout Harrison
County were reconstructed without conforming to the
more restrictive building code standards.
With the influx of federal disaster relief, the larger
towns used the storm as an opportunity for down-
town revitalization. The most severely damaged
areas were rezoned for more intense uses. Forty-six
properties in the Biloxi downtown waterfront area
which were completely destroyed by the storm were
acquired by the town. The land was used for a sub-
stantial urban renewal development. Hazard mitiga-
tion was not, however, the community goal behind
this post-storm property acquisition.
The smaller communities of Long Beach and Pass
Christian did not recover as well as their larger coun-
terparts. Biloxi and Gulfport were better equipped
to handle the disaster and were more successful in
applying for grants to aid in their redevelopment.
Today, hurricane hazard mitigation is a primary
concern of planners in the Harrison County area.
Despite this concern, local decision-makers remain
unsatisfied with public evacuation plans and public
education programs. Long range comprehensive
planning has few supporters in these communities.
Most of the cities' current development regulations,
for example, were federally mandated for inclusion
in the National Flood Insurance Program. There is
little local initiative to bolster hazard mitigation pol-
icies (Leyden 1985).
Gulf Shores, Alabama
Hurricane Fredrick, a category 4 storm on the Saf-
fir-Simpson scale, struck the Alabama coastline in
September 1979. It sustained winds of 130 miles per
hour and caused an estimated $1.7 billion in
property damage. In Gulf Shores, about 30 miles
from the storm's landfall, the first two tiers of water-
front development were almost entirely destroyed
or so severely damaged that they could not be re-
paired. The main beach highway was breached in
a number of sections. The water and sewer lines run-
ning alongside the highway were extensively
damaged.
Compared to many coastal areas, Gulf Shores and
the surrounding Baldwin County area were rela-
tively undeveloped in 1979. The town had only
2,000 permanent residents, although this swelled
manyfold in the summer months. The Gulf Shores
area had been growing through the 1960s and 1970s
as a vacation resort area. At the time of the storm,
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it had a few small motels and two condominium de-
velopments. Single family vacation homes and rental
cottages were the most common type of construction.
The town joined the regular phase of the National
Flood Insurance Program in 1971. In that year a
building code was adopted to comply with the mini-
mum program requirements. Buildings built before
1971, however, were not built to any minimum ele-
vation or structural requirements. State or local reg-
ulation of shoreline development was non-existent
and many buildings were sited too close to the shore
to be adequately protected even from long-term ero-
sion. The lack of a professional planning staff and
an unwieldy zoning ordinance compounded the
town's disaster preparedness problems.
After the storm, sixteen counties in the Mobile
Bay and Florida Panhandle area were declared a Fed-
eral Disaster Area. FEMA set up local disaster assis-
tance centers to coordinate disaster relief activities.
In Gulf Shores, federal funds were used for debris
cleanup and removal, and for the restoration and
repair of damaged public facilities. Eligible public
expenses included public water and sewer services,
roads, recreation and park facilities, and other dam-
aged public property such as public buildings.
The community's ability to recover quickly from
the storm's severe impact was clearly related to the
generous level of financial and technical assistance
provided by FEMA. There were frustrations ex-
pressed, however, over the lack of effective commu-
nication between federal and local officials. Local
officials lacked the knowledge and experience to deal
with strict, often unwieldy federal regulations and
federal bureaucratic channels.
The first action the city took after the storm was
to place a building moratorium on reconstruction
in the beach areas. The moratorium lasted until pub-
lic facilities were restored to the area. Minor repairs
were allowed without a permit, but new construc-
tion and repairs to heavily damaged structures
needed building permits. Large numbers of resi-
dences built prior to the minimum elevation and
building code requirements were heavily damaged.
As nonconforming structures, they were required
to be rebuilt to FEMA standards if the damage re-
quired improvements of fifty percent or more than
their pre-storm value. As might be expected, inspec-
tors were under considerable pressure to underesti-
mate the damages to these structures, particularly
if their owners did not have insurance to cover the
losses.
FEMA used 1362 funds to acquire five beach front
parcels adjacent to the town's public beach and trans-
ferred them to the city. In addition, FEMA funded
the preparation of a supplemental building code
which detailed appropriate construction techniques
for high hazard coastal areas. FEMA also provided
funds for a land use plan. The consultant hired to
prepare the plan, however, worked instead on the
more immediate problem of revising the outdated
zoning ordinance. Over two years of reconstruction
and development took place before these became ef-
fective. Finally, in 1981, the Building Code supple-
ment was passed and, in 1982, the zoning ordinance
was approved with revisions.
The town's economy and municipal budget recov-
ered quickly from the storm. "Freddy," as the residents
refer to the storm, is partly credited with initiating a
lucrative development boom which began while re-
construction was still underway. Local realtors sug-
gest that development pressure had been growing
in the Gulf Shores area and that the storm created
an excellent opportunity for developers to acquire
beach front property with the older structures con-
veniently removed. Numerous property owners,
many who were receiving flood insurance payments
for their destroyed buildings, apparently could not
resist offers for their vacant land at ten to twenty
times its original value. In the two years following
the storm, the town issued 77 permits for multi-
family developments. Many of the units were lo-
cated in the Gulf front area.
The pace of development sparked public protest
over the lack of aesthetic and environmental con-
trols assigned to beachfront building. Minimum
sideyard setback regulations, for example, were suc-
cessfully added to the zoning ordinance when it be-
came increasingly apparent that continued lot-line
to lot-line building was blocking the view of the
Gulf. Despite their disdain for private property regu-
lations, Gulf Shores decision-makers became in-
creasingly receptive to development management
measures as the pace and density of development
reached overbearing levels. Recent problems with
poor water quality and an inability to provide water
service at a rate equal to demand has added to local
interest in development management.
Galveston Bay, Texas
Galveston, Texas is located on a barrier island
twenty-eight miles long and one-half to three miles
wide. It is immediately south of Galveston Bay and















the Houston Metropolitan area. The city has a long
history of storm disasters. In 1900, a very severe
storm killed more than 6,000 people. Following this
storm, the town was rebuilt, elevated with fill, and
a massive seawall was constructed in front of the
city for protection against future storms. After suc-
cessive storms, and as the city expanded, the seawall
was strengthened and extended to its current 9.7
mile length and fifteen foot height. In this century,
hurricanes have struck the Texas coast an average
of every two and a half years. Galveston Island, in
particular, has been hit by eight severe storms pre-
ceeding Alicia (1900, 1915, 1919, 1933, 1942, 1961,
1967, and 1970).
Given the city's maligned history, it is not surpris-
ing that the area has a high degree of hurricane haz-
ard awareness. Unfortunately, government response
to these storm hazards has been oriented to im-
proved barriers and improved evacuation plans
rather than loss prevention efforts. The state is
known for its large structural protection works and
its comprehensive hurricane evacuation and educa-
tion program. The use of planning techniques to re-
duce the amount of property at risk from storm
damage, however, has not been seriously
considered.
Hurricane Alicia struck the Texas coast on August
17, 1983. The eye of the storm passed just south of
Galveston Island. It was a medium size storm with
winds up to 115 miles per hour, and a storm surge
of 6 to 10 feet. The land protected by the seawall
was the only area on the island that escaped flood-
ing. The structures behind it suffered only moderate
wind and rain damage. Low lying areas did not en-
joy such protection, however. In the north end of
the bay, a twelve foot storm surge from Galveston
Bay destroyed 300 homes in the Brownwood subdi-
vision of Baytown. Throughout the island, over
1000 single family homes were destroyed and an ad-
ditional 6,700 received major damage (McCloy and
Huffman 1985).
In the aftermath of the storm, a 1362 acquisition
project was suggested by the FEMA Interagency
Hazard Mitigation Team for the Galveston Bay area
(FEMA 1983a). The teams were established to pro-
mote a comprehensive, intergovernmental approach
to flood hazard mitigation during the post-flood re-
covery process. Under the guidelines of the program,
the FEMA regional director appoints a team of
FEMA experts, key federal agency representatives,
and state and local representatives to study mitiga-
tion strategies for local areas. Specifically, the team's
recommendations are to emphasize non-structural
mitigation measures, and to better ensure that the
various federal agencies involved in post-disaster aid
emphasize mitigation of future flood damages. In
a recent article on Disaster Recovery and Hazard Mi-
tigation, Rubin (1985) indicated that the teams have
had a significant effect on the identification and im-
plementation of mitigation measures at the city and
county levels after a major flood-related disaster.
The Team issues two reports: (1) the Interagency
Flood Hazard Mitigation Report, which is released
fifteen days after the disaster with its suggestions for
post-flood mitigation measures, and (2) the Inter-
agency Post-Flood Recovery Progress Report, released
90 days after the disaster which details progress on
each of the original mitigation proposals (see FEMA
1983a, 1983b). The Hazard Mitigation Team follow-
ing Alicia suggested a number of non-structural mi-
tigation techniques, including a land acquisition
project for the Brownwood area.
For Galveston Island, the report suggested that
the city prepare a comprehensive land use plan to
guide development on the largely vacant west end
of the island. It was argued that this plan should
take account of the environmental needs of the bar-
rier island system by using carrying capacity prin-
ciples. Those long range planning recommendations
were the suggestions of hazard mitigation planning
experts who observed the recovery process and vol-
unteered as participants on the Hazard Mitigation
Team. The remaining recommendations for the Gal-
veston area centered on improvements to the build-
ing code, increasing local evacuation awareness, and
holding seminars for local builders on hurricane re-
sistent construction. The Hazard Mitigation Team's
recommendations were advisory, and had no financ-
ing or enforcement power. According to section 406
of the Disaster Relief Act which authorized the
teams, long term implementation of the team's sug-
gestions are the responsibility of the affected states.
Another change in federal policy since 1980 in-
volves the size of the reimbursement allowance from
Federal Disaster Relief. Today, the FDR will reimburse
local communities for only seventy-five percent of their
eligible expenses; local or state government are re-
sponsible for the remainder. This policy was espe-
cially burdensome for the City of Galveston because
of a locally mandated cap on budget increases and
the large proportion of tax-exempt property within
the city.
After the storm, Galveston adopted a three week
development moratorium on reconstruction in the
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west end of the island. The prohibition did not ap-
ply to structures that only needed minor repairs or
for structures landward of the main beach highway.
The moratorium was extended for two more weeks
for property that was between the beach highway
and the Gulf which included most of the V zones
where the damage was heaviest. The storm had
eroded the beach front property and shifted the vege-
tation line as much as 200 feet landward. The ex-
tended moratorium was requested by the State because
the Texas Open Beaches Act stipulates that the pub-
lic beach extends from the water's edge to the vegeta-
tion line. After this large landward shift, hundreds
of homes were situated on property which the State
Attorney General claimed was public, and rebuilding
was prohibited if structures were more than 50 per-
cent damaged.
In addition to the building moratorium, the city
created a Recovery Task Force. The Task Force was
comprised of a number of subcommittees covering
a range of concerns from insurance problems to
building code modifications. The subcommittees
were mainly staffed by community leaders and citi-
zens who volunteered their expertise to help the re-
covery process. The work of the Task Force seems
to have served a number of important functions: 1)
it diverted pressure away from the overworked city
council; 2) it provided an excellent mechanism for
channelling local expertise (such as architects, build-
ers, mental health experts) into the policy-making
arena; and 3) it provided the community with a
much needed sense that their issues and concerns
were being addressed and that the city government
was responsive and organized despite the post-disas-
ter confusion. The most effective subcommittees
were those that addressed immediate recovery con-
cerns such as insurance problems, or short term
housing needs. The longer-range subcommittees
(such as one for redevelopment of the west end of
the island) were less effective in producing substan-
tive recommendations; members indicated that inter-
est flagged in the months following the storm as the
most pressing community issues were resolved.
Sixteen months after Hurricane Alicia, the storm
was credited with initiating economic revitalization
of the seawall-tourist area. Many of the hotels along
the strip were badly in need of remodeling, and the
convention business had been decreasing in recent
years. Although protected from the storm surge by
the seawall, most of the motels and hotels received
extensive wind and rain damage. Insurance pay-
ments provided remodeling and refurbishing capital.
Galveston, in a continued attempt to bolster its
property tax base, is now encouraging higher den-
sity developments on the west end of the island
through tax-increment financing. The financing
scheme uses the increased property taxes which re-
sult from the new development to finance the devel-
opment's infrastructure costs. There are nine zones
in Galveston: seven in areas unprotected by the city's
seawall; two on the east end of the island, in an ac-
creting beach area in front of the protective seawall;
and five on the low-lying west end of the island (He-
genbarth 1985b).
the value of task force
decision-making
Chip Taylor of Carolina Beach has his daughter, Kelli, all wrapped










Each of the community experiences discussed
above is a unique situation. The cities are of vary-
ing sizes, in different states, with different economic
trends and community values. The recovery and re-
construction experiences were heavily influenced by
the current forms of federal disaster assistance. In
this manner, the communities represent a chrono-
logical sketch of changing federal disaster relief pol-
icy: before the NFIP and FEMA; with the NFIP and
early FEMA; and with the NFIP, FEMA, and the
new Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team. Never-
theless, there are a number of reconstruction trends
and similarities within these communities.
One of the most obvious is the desire of the com-
munity to recover and reconstruct as quickly as pos-
sible in an attempt to return to normalcy. Haas et
al (1977), in the landmark piece Reconstruction Fol-
lowing Disaster, states that during the reconstruction
period, "[t]he central issues and decisions are value
choices that give varying emphasis to the early re-
turn to normalcy, the reduction of future vulnerabil-
ity, or to opportunities for improved efficiency,
equity, and amenity." After a storm, some repairs
will begin immediately, such as those to public water
and sewer, electricity, and the road system. Unless
plans have been made preceding the storm to relo-
cate or redesign these facilities, the sense of urgency
to replace these may preclude hazard mitigation op-
portunities, as evidenced in Gulf Shores. This sense
of urgency also affects residential reconstruction.
Homeowners living in temporary housing want to
repair their homes and move back in as soon as pos-
sible. Haas mentions that the strongest pressure of
all for a prompt return to normalcy comes from the
existence of impacted and displaced families and
businesses, and adds that these pressures do not cre-
ate a positive environment for orderly, well-planned
reconstruction processes.
These pressures were particularly felt by those
members of the community who were in positions
to either speed or delay the reconstruction period.
Building Inspectors in both Galveston and Gulf
Shores felt strong pressures to be lenient in issuing
building permits to allow rebuilding. This was most
intense when the building was non-conforming to
current codes, and heavily damaged. In Gulf Shores,
structures damaged more than 50 percent by law
had to conform to the new building code and NFIP
elevation requirements, which could have added
substantially to the reconstruction costs of a non-
conforming building. Particularly when the home-
owner did not have insurance to cover the losses,
much less the cost of rebuilding to higher standards,
officials felt severe pressure to be lenient with neigh-
bors who had "suffered enough already." In Texas,
the Open Beaches Act prohibiting reconstruction
was only applied to structures more than 50 percent
damaged, but sympathetic local inspectors generally
issued rebuilding permits to structures which had
any exterior walls remaining. Policies set in place
before a disaster regarding these decisions and specify-
ing explicit criteria would help ease the discretionary
pressure felt by local officials. In addition, bringing
in temporary inspection officials would help reduce
the massive workload increase, and non-members
of the community would be able to make politically
difficult decisions more objectively.
In addition to the psychological stresses created
during the initial recovery and reconstruction period
which may work against new hazard reducing de-
velopment policies, the storm may also produce
some long-term community perceptions that could
work as obstacles to the enactment of new hazard
mitigation policies. A post-storm perception ex-
pressed in all three communities was that damages
were a function of substandard construction. In-
deed, all the communities had large numbers of se-
verely damaged homes which were constructed prior
to building code and elevation requirements. Build-
ing codes, elevation requirements, and hurricane re-
sistent construction will, of course, help reduce the
level of damages but as the hurricane-proof house
in Harrison County dramatically illustrated, they
should not be regarded as a panacea for safe shore-
line development.
In Galveston and Gulf Shores, it is possible that
the newer requirements for building codes and mini-
mum elevations are perceived as having had a signif-
icant effect on reducing storm damages. Attitudes
expressed in interviews, however, indicate that these
may have had the detrimental effect of lulling the
communities into a false sense of security regarding
their ability to survive another major storm without
sustaining heavy damages. Policy makers concerned
with hazard mitigation may have to overcome this
community perception before other development
management techniques become politically viable.
Well-publicized evacuation plans and procedures
can also add to a false sense of community security.
People may be less likely to actively support hurri-
cane-hazard mitigation policies if they perceive that
they are no longer in any danger. In an area with
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limited access, this will become increasingly impor-
tant as the population size at risk increases beyond
the evacuation capacity of the road system. In Gal-
veston, the evacuation demand is already greater
than the current evacuation capacity, and evacuating
residents could be placed in severe danger during
a full scale evacuation of the island. Residents, how-
ever, seem to express an attitude that if there is a
storm threat, "they will just get up and leave the is-
land," not taking into account that the rest of the
local population has similar plans.
Another community perception evident in both
Galveston and Gulf Shores was that the hurricane
had assisted in producing an economic revitalization
and development boom. After a storm, the large in-
flux of non-local funds from federal and insurance
sources seems to create a heady, almost "boomtown"
atmosphere. With the stress and tension of the im-
mediate recovery period behind them, the post-
storm impressions of community inhabitants seemed
to concentrate on positive economic impacts that the
storm initiated. Even in Harrison County, which did
not experience a significant development boom fol-
lowing Camille, there was a "renewed spirit in the
communities to build back bigger and stronger than
before" (Leyden 1985). The mayor of Gulf Shores
commented that, for his community, there was "a
definite silver lining to the storm."
While the hurricanes did not produce the eco-
nomic boom that occurred afterwards, the storms
appear to have stimulated the processes and short-
ened the time span over which development might
have otherwise taken place. The coastal disaster cre-
ated excellent opportunities for developers to acquire
cheap land, and to approach numerous land owners
who might be more receptive to selling their land
after their homes were severely damaged and after
they had received insurance payments. Policymakers
will have to consider these economic development
forces for two reasons. First, the stronger the devel-
opment forces in the private marketplace, the more
likely that these forces may work against innovative
mitigation efforts, particularly non-structural flood-
hazard mitigation efforts (see Rubin 1985). Second,
and more subtly, it appears that the economic boom
and financial benefits which residents enjoy as a per-
ceived result of the storm, may tend to overshadow
and downplay the damaging and painful effects that
the severe storms produced in the community. This
may lessen the community-based support and inter-
est for hazard mitigation and pre-storm disaster
planning.
While each coastal community will respond and
react to different forces following a severe storm,
planners and policymakers in hurricane prone com-
munities need to acknowledge underlying percep-
tions and trends which may act as obstacles to
enacting hazard mitigation policies. The communi-
ties discussed here were all Gulf coast communities:
traditionally very conservative regarding regulation
of private property, and not historically innovative
in planning techniques. In areas similar to these, the
greatest success for the adoption of hazard mitiga-
tion regulations appears to occur when the proposed
regulations will further other community objectives
which are capable of arousing sufficient community
support to overcome the obstacles to their enact-
ment. Examples of community goals which might
receive a broader based support are aesthetics, or
open space and beach acquisition.
Where development interests are strong and the
localities conservative, the few coastal development
continued on page 43
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continued from page 35
regulations existing have been state or federally
mandated. State and federal programs need to con-
tinue to provide muscle for the adoption of hazard
mitigation policies, and should perhaps be assessed
to insure that existing programs are not providing
any additional incentives for unwise coastal develop-
ment.
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